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DISINFORMATION AS WARFARE IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
DIMENSIONS, DILEMMAS, AND SOLUTIONS
Minna Aslama Horowitz

One of the few dissidents of the techno-optimist
era, Evgeny Morozov, foresaw today’s challenges
in his book, The Net Delusion: The Dark
he vast majority of conflicts today are
Side of Internet Freedom (2011), in which he
not fought by nation states and their
points out that technology, including digital
armies; increasingly, they are fought not with
communications tools and networks, is neutral;
conventional weapons but with words. A specific
the very same tools that enable connections and
sort of weaponry—“fake news” and viral
participation can be used for misinformation and
disinformation—has been at the center of policy
surveillance. Morozov may not, however, have
discussions, public debates, and academic analyses
quite imagined the extent of the
in recent years. Some suggest that
problems of today’s media and
the turning point for the current
communication landscape. It is
“Yet the developments
global epidemic of disinformation
telling that the very term “fake
started with a physical armed
of the past few years
news” is being used both as a
conflict between Russia and
seem
to
have
surprised
description of a phenomenon and
Ukraine in 2014 (e.g., Khaldarova
as a political propaganda tool.
and shocked journalists,
& Pantti, 2016). Others note that
In addition, what has been called
unverified reporting by the New
politicians, policymakers,
the “emerging information arms
York Times during the Iraq War
race” (Posetti & Matthews, 2018,
technologists,
scholars,
qualifies as fake news, and that,
July 23) is plaguing mature and
in fact, Octavian’s propaganda
and audiences alike.”
emerging democracies alike.
campaign against Mark Anthony,

INTRODUCTION: AGE-OLD WEAPONRY
DIGITIZED

T

in 44 BC, is an example of the
same broad phenomenon (Posetti
& Matthews, 2018, July 23). To be sure, in the
world of communication and media content, fake
news and propaganda are nothing new.
Yet the developments of the past few years
seem to have surprised and shocked journalists,
politicians, policymakers, technologists, scholars,
and audiences alike. This may simply be a result
of so-called “techno-utopian” thinking, which
predicted that the internet would create new kinds
of democratic practices, including networked
publics and deliberative processes (e.g., Erickson
& Aslama, 2010), even in the global public sphere
(Castells, 2008). However, this turned out not be
the case.
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As it is with “traditional”
war and warfare, so it is with
communication weaponry: things are messy, and
there is no one reason for the disorder and no
one frontier on which battles are waged. Not
every weapon is equally powerful, not everyone is
equally vulnerable, and no single act can diffuse
the war. This article seeks to summarize the
complex contexts, definitions, and manifestations
of the current disinformation landscape. It suggests
an analytical framework, the “circuits of power”
(Clegg, 1989), to illustrate how information wars
impact those most vulnerable, to showcase some
suggested solutions, and, ultimately, to highlight
the responsibility of multiple levels of participants
in a democracy.
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FROM ARRESTED WARS TO SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM TO CIRCUITS OF POWER:
DIMENSIONS OF DISINFORMATION
What makes today’s context particularly
challenging is that old forms of propaganda,
including editorial decisions, are now combined
with human influencers and opinion makers, viral
online sharing, and the automated content creation
of disinformation (Nedeva, Horsley, & Thompson,
2018). On one hand, digital communication
has created a new landscape of “Arrested War”
(O’Loughlin & Hoskins, 2015, January 14). The
current situation can be seen as a continuum in the
relationship between wars and media coverage.
For instance, the broadcast era was defined by
agenda-setting and gatekeeping by large national
news organizations. The following phase featured
citizen journalists and networked communication
for dispersed understandings of war. Today, the
battle over meanings and representations is back
and, hence, a heightened need for, and creation of,
disinformation:
It is not just that media has enclosed war
within its infrastructure. Media arrests war. It
stops war escaping—escaping unintelligibility,
escaping mainstream coverage, escaping the
control of military commanders. To arrest is to
seize, or to stop or check. To arrest is also to
attract the attention of. Those protagonists we
would expect to be operating in hard-to-reach
places—such as IS—seek the attention of the
most open and popular channels and spaces.
They are drawn to the mainstream media
ecology because it has re-asserted its function
as primary channel of the world’s affairs.
(O’Loughlin & Hoskins, 2015, January 14)
On the other hand, disinformation can be seen as
a byproduct of a different kind of war, one that is
fought in an attention economy (e.g., Wu, 2016),
under the conditions of so-called “surveillance
capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015). Here, search engines
and social media platforms make money de facto
by selling predictions based on the data they
collect.
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These two phenomena, as separate as they may
seem, are both the cause and the manifestations
of the same societal trends. In general, there are
several interconnected broad developments: As
societies, and individuals, we have witnessed a
shift in our relationship with knowledge; that
is, common ideas of objectivity and “truth” are
not prominent in public debates. This is coupled
with a cultural shift that is marked by distrust
in elites and institutions, whether political,
journalistic, or scientific. More broadly, cases of
deep dissatisfaction in existing political actors,
systems, and structures are continuously emerging.
The economic conditions of the media and
communication markets are marked by fierce
competition. Technological advances have fostered
fragmentation among media publics and created
information habits based on algorithms, microsegmenting, and viral content sharing, usually
among peers and closed groups (McNair, 2018).
Still, the question of disinformation in today’s
media landscape cannot be easily grouped into
neat empirical categories, for analytical analysis,
or for concrete policy actions to curb fake
news. Several high-level, multi-country, multistakeholder efforts, as well as numerous academic
and applied research projects, have attempted
to address these multiple phenomena that are
related to disinformation and its dissemination,
from a variety of angles, including intent, action,
and type of content. The thinking and definitions
around the various dimensions of these complex
challenges reflect the authors’ expertise and
concerns.
For instance, the way Facebook defines the
phenomena of fake news is threefold (Derakhshan
& Wardle, 2017). First, there are “Information
(or Influence) Operations,” which are actions
taken by governments or organized non-state
actors to distort domestic or foreign political
sentiment, most frequently to achieve a strategic
and/or geopolitical outcome. These operations
can use a combination of methods. There is also
“False News,” or news articles that purport to
be factual but contain intentional misstatements
of fact to arouse passions, attract viewership,
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or deceive readers. Finally, one can identify
“False Amplifiers,” meaning coordinated activity
by inauthentic accounts that has the intent of
manipulating the political discussion.
A policy brief by the London School of Economics
(Tambini, 2017) discusses several content
categories: alleged foreign interference in domestic
elections through fake news; new advertisement
models that open new opportunities for people to
make money through the peddling of fake news;
parody and satire; bad journalism; news that is
ideologically opposed; and news that challenges
orthodox authority. A report for the Council of
Europe (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) targeted
at researchers and policymakers discusses an
“information disorder framework.” This model
includes (1) types of information disorder based
on intent, ranging from unintentional false content
to disinformation (i.e., false or manipulated
content and context, or a broader social use with
false content and the intent to harm). In this
framework, one can also distinguish (2) the phases
of information disorder (i.e., creation, production,
and distribution). Finally, one can distinguish (3)
the elements, meaning the agents (i.e., who created
the message and why?), the message (i.e., what was
the content?), and the interpretation (i.e., how was
it interpreted?).
The European Union (EU) multi-stakeholder
High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Fake
News and Online Disinformation (European
Commission, 2018) discusses in its report three
main aspects of current disinformation landscape
beyond false news. It first addresses the problem
of fabricated information blended with facts and
practices that go well beyond anything resembling
news. This category includes automated accounts
with networks of fake followers; fabricated
or manipulated videos; targeted advertising;
organized trolling; and visual memes. The report
also addresses an array of digital behavior that
is more about the circulation of disinformation
than it is about the production of disinformation,
including posting, commenting, sharing, tweeting,
and retweeting. Finally, the dimension of
stakeholders is discussed, which includes state or
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non-state political actors, for-profit actors, citizens
individually or in groups, and infrastructures of
circulation and amplification (including news
media, platforms and underlying networks, and
protocols and algorithms).
The above examples illustrate the variety of
approaches that a study by the European
Commission Joint Research Centre (Martens,
Aguiar, Gomez-Herrera, & Mueller-Langer,
2018) summarizes as follows: The narrow
approach focuses on verifiably false information.
Fact-checking can expose false news items and
identify the sources of these articles. This form
is easy to identify and can be countered by, for
example, hiring fact-checkers, tagging suspicious
postings, and removing false news posts. The
broad approach, in contrast, pertains to deliberate
attempts at the distortion of news to promote
ideologies, confuse, and create polarization, as
well as disinformation for the purpose of earning
money but not necessarily of causing harm. While
much of this can be politically motivated, these
attempts can take a form of clickbait practices and
the intentional filtering of news for commercial
purposes, to attract particular audiences. This
approach is harder to empirically study and verify,
and it pertains to the economic models of news
markets and variations in the quality of news.
One could label the more limited phenomenon as
“disinformation” and the broader understanding
as “information disorder,” which has multiple
causes and manifestations (e.g., Wardle &
Derakhshan, 2017).
Yet another approach, applied in the present
article, is to view the vast issues and dimensions
related to disinformation and information disorder
as being manifested in different levels of the
“circuits of power” (Clegg, 1989). In its original
form, the theory of circuits of power is about the
context in which power is being used and in which
it potentially appears. The first circuit is the overt,
or macro-level, one of (political) decision-making
power. The second is the systemic-economic
circuit of power that contextualizes policy-making
decisions, including the power of institutions. The
third, social, circuit describes cultural meanings
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created by individuals and groups—elements that
also provide context to the macro-level circuit.
This framework, used to look at disinformation
and information disorder, could be seen selfevident. Within media and communication
studies, especially within its critical strands,
the creation, dissemination, and interpretation
of information and representations have, for
decades, been associated with power—whether
the question is about the role of the media and
media institutions in societies (e.g., Curran,
2002), or about the use of language for power
in mediated contexts (Fairclough, 1995). It
is often expressed as an ideological struggle
over meanings. In other words, in both Clegg’s
analytical framework, and critical media studies,
power is relational and always in flux, contested,
and perhaps especially poignantly in this case. As
an obvious example, the micro-level circuit level,
even if made vulnerable by structures and certain
platforms, also uses the power to create and share
disinformation extremely effectively. A prime
example of this power struggle is the concept of
fake news, its meanings ranging from weaponized
political rhetoric, to an analytical definition of the
phenomenon, to value-laden political rhetoric.
As applied in the case of disinformation and
information disorder, the circuits of power can
function as an analytical framework as follows:
• A macro-level concern about societal
structures, power interests, and the
governance of power, including media and
communications policy-making;
• A meso-level modality of legacy media
institutions and different (more or less
institutionalized) digital hubs and platforms
for the distribution and sharing of content;
and
• A micro-level activity in which
disinformation is seen as actions (i.e.,
creation, interpretation, and sharing) by
people as individuals or collectives.

IMPACT: VULNERABILITIES AND FAKE NEWS
Circuits of power as an analytical model is
especially useful when assessing the positions
of, and impact upon, those who are the most
powerless and vulnerable; vulnerability in an
individual (at the micro level) is reflected in—and,
many would argue, very often produced by—
societal structures and failures of institutions.
Macro Level: Vulnerable Societies
Information disorder seems to impact most
nations. Famously, research has confirmed the
impact of targeted political advertising as well as
disinformation during the 2016 United States (US)
elections, although the impact of disinformation
upon the actual election results seems much
weaker than public speculation has suggested
(Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess, Nyhan, &
Reifler, 2016.) Similarly, in the United Kingdom
(UK), the parliamentary committee investigating
fake news raised concerns of voter targeting in the
Brexit referendum (Pegg & Duncan, 2018, April
16), and there have been fears of interference in
several European elections.
However, a multi-country study on Asia
(Kaijimoto & Stanley, 2018) showcases how
different contexts create conditions for different
manifestations and with different scales of impact.
For example, while in Japan most problematic
information seems to stay within certain
communities and rarely gains traction and in
South Korea fake news is not a business, in India
both political and other types of disinformation
runs rampant, especially on WhatsApp, the
main gateway for most Indians to the internet.
Indonesia, too, features successful professional
fake news and hate speech producers, who create
made-to-order divisive and sectarian content. In
the Philippines, threats and intimidation from
government and nongovernment sources alike
create a fertile ground for severe information
disorder and mistrust in institutions.
Unsurprisingly, then, the more volatile and divided
a society is in political and social aspects, the more
vulnerable it is to disinformation. This is clear in
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the case of Central and Eastern Europe, where
some nations, after building democratic regimes,
are now bordering on or have become full-fledged
“illiberal democracies,” that is, democratically
elected governments that are ignoring the
constitutional limitations of their reach and, often,
limiting rights of the citizens (Zakaria, 1997, p.
22). These countries are also vulnerable to foreign
influence: The European Journalism Observatory
notes that especially the Baltic States and Ukraine
continue to be the targets of permanent Russian
disinformation attacks (Russ-Mohl, 2018, April 19).
As observed by many others after Morozov, the
digital weapons of democracy can equally be
used for dictatorial purposes. It has been argued
that the Arab Spring is a case that highlights
this particularly well: dissidents and their
allies may have been skillful in organizing and
mobilizing actions via the internet (and especially
social media), but the same tools were used by
authorities to crack down on dissident action
(Maréchal, 2018, November 16).
Meso Level: Vulnerable Institutions
Following Zuboff’s (2015) idea of surveillance
capitalism, one could claim that media institutions,
especially social media platforms, are thriving only
on their ability to target audiences. At the same
time, they seem to have been—perhaps naively,
perhaps not—ignorant of the potential dangers
they could pose.
Facebook is probably the most blatant and the
most well-documented case. Research by Guess,
Nyhan, and Reifler (2016) indicates that Facebook
played an important role in directing people to
fake news websites during the 2016 US elections.
They found that heavy Facebook users were
likely to consume fake news, which was often
immediately preceded by a visit to Facebook.
Facebook is also the central player in the viral
spread of disinformation and hate speech in
Myanmar (e.g., McLauglin, 2018, July 6) and Sri
Lanka (e.g., Taub & Fisher, 2018). In Brazil, both
Facebook and WhatsApp are part of information
disorder (e.g., Phillips, 2018, October 10).
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Facebook’s attempts to curb viral falsehoods,
ranging from setting up fact-checking operations
to collaborating with academics (Lyons, 2018,
June 21) do not seem to have been very effective
thus far. Ironically, it has been revealed that in
2018, Facebook started a public relations (PR)
war against its own critics. One of the main targets
was the billionaire George Soros. This occurred
after Soros had criticized Facebook in early 2018
and noted that Google and Facebook exploit the
social environment by being de facto monopolies
and by reaching out to markets in countries that
might not adhere to the democratic use of the
media: “people without the freedom of mind can
be easily manipulated” (Soros, 2018, January 25).
Unfortunately, the PR retaliation by Facebook
fueled, perhaps unintentionally, the spread of antiSemitic disinformation about Soros (e.g., Bowles
& Wichter, 2018, November 22).
One could perhaps conclude that, if the intention
of platforms such as Facebook is indeed to foster
democratic communication, their technological
structures and business models—under the
conditions of surveillance capitalism that they
themselves created—make them the vulnerable,
unwilling middle-men of information disorder.
The other alternative, the prioritization of revenue
over human rights and security, is an unfortunately
dark scenario.
However, the institutions that are truly vulnerable
in this situation are legacy media organizations.
They are increasingly dependent on the same
platforms that spread digital disinformation. A
recent study by the Pew Research Center indicates
that approximately one third of news audiences
in the global North and global South visit social
media daily to get their news (Poushter, 2018,
October 25). It is no surprise that the new digital
attention economy has changed the journalism
business, a process that Franklin (2014) has called
the crises of “Financial Viability” and “Civic
Adequacy.” The conditions of the media landscape
have prompted battles for audiences that, in turn,
have resulted in increasingly polarizing coverage
and clickbait intended to drive traffic to their
online and mobile portals. Journalism paywalls
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country and a problem for democracy in general.
have begun pay off to some big players, such as
According to the survey of the Reuters Institute
the New York Times (Lee & Molla, 2018), but
Digital News Report 2018 (Newman, Fletcher,
such paywalls may keep some news consumers
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018), which
out. Recent research indicates that because news
included 37 countries, more than half of the
companies rely on Facebook for their audience,
surveyed news audiences agree or strongly agree
they continue to be trapped in the attention
that they are concerned about what is real and
economy; if they were to abandon social media
fake on the internet.
platforms, they would lose
traffic even if they would not
Yet it is those who are the most
“…it is those who are the most
lose revenue (Myllylahti, 2018).
deprived and vulnerable—
Further, current information
deprived and vulnerable—
whether in terms of social
disorder has had a ripple effect,
standing, access, and/or media
whether
in
terms
of
social
resulting in many people having
literacy—who may suffer the
very little trust in the media, even
standing, access, and/or media
most from disinformation and
if such a view is undeserved. The
literacy—who may suffer the
information disorder. There
Reuters Institute Digital News
are numerous recent, wellmost from disinformation and
Report 2018 (Newman, Fletcher,
documented cases to illustrate
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen,
information disorder.”
this. Perhaps the most well2018) highlights this shrinking
known is the case of the atrocities
trust in online media. Another
against the Rohingya Muslim
study notes that, although trust
minority in Myanmar and the role of Facebook in
in traditional journalism seems to be on the rise
facilitating it. Facebook was already used several
globally, two thirds of all news audiences believe
years ago to fuel conflicts between Buddhist and
media institutions are more interested in big
Muslim groups, but it seemed that the company
ratings, more views, and more website visits than
was more interested in the country as a business
they are in reporting (Southern, 2018, January 25).
opportunity and did relatively little to address the
situation (McLaughlin, 2018). The vast spread of
Finally, national legacy news media are sometimes
hate speech and disinformation became clear in
vulnerable because they are more easily controlled
2017 when the violence by the military against
than are online media. A prime case is that of
Rohingya Muslims intensified. Facebook was then
legacy news media in Hungary. As Freedom
harnessed, as it was the platform unifying citizens
House (2018) reports, “While private, oppositionin a country where a democratic media system was
aligned media outlets exist, national, regional,
being built. Because Facebook is technically merely
and local media are increasingly dominated by
a platform for user-generated content and is used
pro-government outlets, which are frequently
by the government to disseminate information to
used to smear political opponents.” This case is
the public, it was thus an easily weaponizable tool.
not unique, as it is also occurring in Central and
The United Nations (UN) rapporteurs on human
Eastern Europe (e.g., Knight, 2018, November 23)
rights in Myanmar put it bluntly:
and elsewhere.
Micro Level: Vulnerable Audiences
To be sure, fake news and related phenomena
are a real concern for audiences everywhere. The
Eurobarometer of March 2018 (Eurobarometer,
2018) reveals that almost 40 percent of Europeans
come across fake news every day or almost every
day. More than 80 percent of the respondents
perceive fake news to be a problem in their
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[Social media] has . . . substantively contributed
to the level of acrimony and dissension and
conflict, if you will, within the public. Hate
speech is certainly of course a part of that. As
far as the Myanmar situation is concerned,
social media is Facebook, and Facebook is
social media. (Miles, 2018, March 12)
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Facebook has since commissioned an independent
review of the situation and notes that it cannot
be responsible for the structural challenges of the
nation (Warofka, 2018, November 5). However,
whether the platform is responsible or not, very
similar conflicts between the Buddhist majority
and Muslim minority also occurred in Sri Lanka,
also fueled by rumors and disinformation. An
investigative journalism report concludes the
following:
Time and again, communal hatreds overrun
the newsfeed—the primary portal for news
and information for many users—unchecked
as local media are displaced by Facebook
and governments find themselves with little
leverage over the company. Some users,
energized by hate speech and misinformation,
plot real-world attacks. (Taub & Fisher, 2018)
In a vulnerable country on the way to democracy,
those with a minority standing are an easy target.
However, vulnerability also comes from limited
access to a diversity of media and sources; hence,
those that are prevalent can have an even more
significant impact. A lack of opportunities to learn
critical media literacy skills adds to vulnerability.
Another aspect of vulnerability could be seen as
geopolitical: in the reviewed cases, those affected,
even at the country level, may not be considered
important enough or may not have a loud enough
voice in global public deliberations for platforms to
really care and respond in the most efficient way.
Finally, as studies about the 2016 US election,
perhaps unsurprisingly, point out, influencers
(i.e., those with a strong social–political standing
and media-online presence in any specific
country or context) are key to the spread of viral
disinformation (e.g., Lewis, 2018, November 20).
Those who are being heard in the information
overflow are powerful; those whose voices do
not bear weight will be left vulnerable, unable to
counter disinformation.
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RESPONSES: MULTITUDE OF WEAPONS,
MULTI-LEVEL SOLUTIONS
How do you solve a disorder that is both global
and national; that relates to both big money
and inflammatory politics; that involves three
distinct but interconnected vulnerabilities? There
are numerous, ongoing attempts being made to
address policies (at the structural level), media
organizations (at the institutional level), and media
audiences (at the consumer level).
Macro Level: “Soft” Media and Communications
Policies
Information disorder has been recognized to
be a problem by international policy-making
bodies. The Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, given to the
UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council,
recognized this multi-level problem:
Although the Internet remains history’s
greatest tool for global access to information,
such online evangelism is hard to find today.
The public sees hate, abuse and disinformation
in the content users generate. Governments see
terrorist recruitment or discomfiting dissent
and opposition. Civil society organizations
see the outsourcing of public functions,
like protection of freedom of expression, to
unaccountable private actors. . . . The United
Nations, regional organizations and treaty
bodies have affirmed that offline rights apply
equally online, but it is not always clear that
the companies protect the rights of their users
or that States give companies legal incentives
to do so. (United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner, 2018, p. 3)
Numerous inter-governmental bodies have begun
to give policy statements on global disinformation
and information disorder. For instance, a Joint
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and
“Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda
[Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), 2017] was produced by the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
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Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom
of the Media, the Organization of American States
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression,
and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and Access to Information. The Nordic
Council of Ministers convened its own high-level
group of key experts and launched a booklet to
start a discussion about how to counter fakes
and build trust in words and facts (Lundgren,
Bjerregård, Mogens, Hanson, & Starum, 2017).
Perhaps the most proactive stance has been taken
by the EU, with its aforementioned HLEG on
Fake News and Online Disinformation (European
Commission, 2018). This multi-stakeholder
group has come up with five core actions: (1)
enhancing the transparency of online news; (2)
promoting media and information literacy to
counter disinformation; (3) developing tools for
empowering users and journalists; (4) tackling
disinformation and fostering positive engagement
with fast-evolving information technologies; and
(5) safeguarding the diversity and sustainability of
the European news media ecosystem. In addition,
it is important to promote continued research on
the impact of disinformation in Europe, to evaluate
the measures that have been thus far taken.
At the same time, given the global and local
contexts, today’s situation is seen by many as a
watershed for media and communication policies
and regulation: Can policies reframe media
audiences and communication technology users
as citizens with rights? Can they help to restore
citizens’ trust in media and the potential of free
speech? There is a great fear of overreaching
in policy-making, which would open doors
to censorship, or, at the minimum, diminish
journalistic integrity and autonomy. Strong
journalistic self-governance codes exist, and
consequently, some fear also exists that panEuropean efforts, such as the Code of Conduct
suggested in the EU HLEG report, are potentially
harmful: “An EU-sponsored ‘Code of Codes’ for
the whole media universe is not only unnecessary
and in large parts redundant, at best, but can
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distract attention away from the real causes of the
problem, while putting additional burden on those
who are already fighting it” (Reporters without
Borders [RwB], 2018a, March 12).
Many citizens, however, seem to expect
governments to implement some governance
measures. The responsibility for information
disorder, according to most respondents surveyed
in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report
2018 (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy,
& Nielsen, 2018), rests with both publishers and
platforms. This demonstrates that there is some
public appetite for government intervention to
stop fake news, especially in Europe and Asia.
Those with higher levels of news literacy tend
to prefer newspaper brands over television
networks, and use social media for news very
differently than does the wider population. They
are also more cautious about interventions by
governments to deal with misinformation. Similar
views emerge from the recent Eurobarometer
(2018). In respondents’ views, journalists,
national authorities, and press and broadcasting
management should be the ones mainly responsible
for stopping the spread of disinformation.
International and intra-governmental “soft
policy” solutions, rather than new national laws
and regulatory measures, may indeed be the best
remedy. National laws pertaining to fake news can
be a double-edged sword. In Germany, the law
against online hate speech—the Net Enforcement
Law (NetzDG)—has caused confusion because the
very concepts of hate speech and disinformation
are difficult to apply in practice (The Economist,
2018, January 13). In Egypt, a law seemingly
punishing creators of fake news has been used to
stifle dissent (Michaelson, 2018, July 27).
However, some specific “soft policy” ideas, if
not measures, remain in the works. The Council
of Europe is currently (as of November 2018)
working on its report and policy statement on
the role of public service broadcasting (PSB) in
tackling disinformation and information disorder.
Its foci are not only fact-checking but also the
ideal of quality journalism, media literacy, and
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universal reach, via innovations and multiplatform presence—in essence, features that are
included in the EU HLEG recommendations.
Similar kinds of solutions are envisioned in the
recent policy brief by the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU, 2018) and in other countries, such as
Canada (McGuire & Cormier, 2017, February 9).

need the news, or people who are left out of
decision-making because they don’t fit the
socio-demographic profile that means they
would normally be included. To me, right now,
there is almost nothing more important than
having robust public service media available to
citizens. ( . . . )

Meso Level: Public Media and Collaborations

Existing political systems and public service
broadcasters need to be free to imagine the
kinds of information ecosystems that they’d
want at the nation/state level and then real
freedom to experiment with and find new
paths to deliver that. And also to think about
themselves oriented in a world where it could
well be that large-scale technology platforms—
designed, built, operated in America—will be
taking over much of what your information
ecosystem looks like over the next decade. (as
cited in Hofseth, 2018, April 2)

Both the Council of Europe (Aslama Horowitz,
2018) and the EBU (EBU, 2018) suggest that
PSB and its multi-platform version, public service
media (PSM), offer one institutional, meso-level
remedy. This solution to “internet-gone-wrong”
may not be that far-fetched: as Curran (2012)
pointed out, American and, later, European
counter-cultural ideals, as well as a European
public service ideology, significantly impacted
internet development. Further, as a recent Pew
Research Journalism & Media study (Mitchell et
al., 2018, May 14) documents, in Europe, where
the public media tradition is the strongest, the
most trusted media, from television to online
content, are those run by PSB organizations.
It has been frequently noted that PSB and media
are, as institutions, part of the media policy
toolkits that can counter market-driven challenges
such as the concentration of ownership, increased
competition, diminishing content diversity, and
inequalities in access to media (Bajomi-Lazar,
2017). Information disorder, many scholars
argue, is the perfect storm of commercialization,
globalization, and political interference (e.g.,
Martens, Aguiar, Gomez-Herrera, & MuellerLanger, 2018)—and the original premise of
PSB being non-commercial, nation-based, and
independent is an antidote. Many proponents of
PSM note that it is needed now more than ever.
Emily Bell, the director of the Tow Center for
Digital Journalism at Columbia University, posits
the following:
Everyone in public service journalism comes
to work every day with a mission to inform
the citizens of their country, and to try and
reach everybody. Even people who can’t pay,
even people who don’t necessarily think they
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The case of disinformation and information
disorder may also highlight, better than any
other case, the role of PSB/PSM as a key partner
in solving global challenges of the media
landscape in a more localized, contextual manner,
in collaboration with other trusted partners.
Collaborations for effective and comprehensive
fact-checking have perhaps been the most visible
response by public broadcasters to false content.
They have engaged in different collaborative factchecking efforts, sometimes with their (otherwise)
competitors.
In Austria, for instance, the public service known
as the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF)
has joined the effort of a variety of partners in
raising awareness about fake news, through the
Austrian Press Agency (APA), of which it and most
daily newspapers are shareholders.1 In Norway,
Faktisk.no is an independent fact-checking
organization, owned by the media companies
VG, Dagbladet, TV 2, and the public broadcaster
NRK.2 Following this model, the public services
Swedish Television (SVT) and Swedish Radio
(SR), as well as the two largest daily newspapers,
Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, have
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started a project to collaborate on fact-checking
methods and news-spreading during the electoral
movement. The stakeholders have conducted a
joint training program for journalists in which
participants collaborate on fact-checking using
methods is based on the guidelines from the
International Fact Checking Network (IFCN).
Perhaps the most well-known multi-stakeholder
collaboration is First Draft News, which is hosted
at Harvard University. The project has more
than 40 members, including commercial and
public service media, around the world (e.g., the
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], France
Télévisions, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [ZDF],
Deutsche Welle, and Eurovision), not-for-profit
and de facto public media organizations such as
Global Voices and ProPublica, and platforms such
as Facebook and Twitter.3
Micro Level: Media and Information Literacy
How can individuals be protected from
information disorder? A report by the Columbia
Journalism Review notes that “Media literacy
works, and it just might save humanity,” but adds
that old tools are not enough “when a hacker
in Macedonia can easily create a website that
looks legitimate, then quickly make thousands
of dollars from advertising as bogus stories
circulate” (Rosenwald, 2017, Fall). In the US, there
are hundreds, if not thousands, of projects that
have been set up, or reinvigorated, by the surge
of disinformation around and after the 2016 US
elections (e.g., Sullivan & Bajarin, 2018, August
23). As a result, legislators are on the alert. For
example, California has passed a law to boost
media literacy education in schools (Minichiello,
2018, September 3).
In Europe, media education is often explicitly
or implicitly mandated, not only for schools
but also for PSBs. Many have taken on the task.
For instance, France Télévisions Education has
a collection of videos about the phenomenon of
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disinformation,4 and the Swiss Schweizer Radio
und Fernsehen (SRF) “My School” has published
an educational teaching module specifically about
fake news.5 Some PSM organizations focus on
the nature of quality journalism, fact-finding, and
trust, with a comprehensive approach to media
and information literacy. The BBC, for example,
has offered mentoring from BBC journalists, in
person, online, or at group events, to a thousand
schools. All schools have free access to online
materials, including classroom activities, video
tutorials, and an interactive game called BBC
iReporter. The game gives the player the chance
to take on the role of a journalist in the BBC
newsroom and addresses issues related quality
reporting and disinformation.6 In addition, a
Reality Check Roadshow toured the country in the
UK in Spring 2018, and local schools were able
to nominate their own students to attend one of a
dozen regional events.7
Children and young people, even though they
are now digital natives, are still vulnerable
populations, so it is understandable that many
activities concentrate on media literacy that keeps
them safe. Fact-checking efforts could also be seen
as a form of media and information literacy, and
the aforementioned First Draft News, for instance,
has engaged audiences directly in a project related
to the French elections.8 Media development
projects and activities by international
organizations are addressing contexts in which
the structural and organizational vulnerabilities
are great; as an example, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNESCO supports media and information literacy
in Myanmar to address the inter-cultural challenge
of hate speech [United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
2018, May 31].
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CONCLUSION: INFORMATIONAL WARFARE
AND MEDIA FREEDOM
For several decades, we have feared cybersecurity
and cyberwars in the form of attacks on computers
to affect central infrastructures, such as energy
production. Now, however, information warfare
has become the most prevalent and complex cyber
weapon. A feature in Foreign Policy in 2018 put it
succinctly:
The nature of cyberwarfare is that it is
asymmetric. Single combatants can find and
exploit small holes in the massive defenses
of countries and country-sized companies.
It won’t be cutting-edge cyberattacks that
cause the much-feared cyber-Pearl Harbor
in the United States or elsewhere. Instead,
it will likely be mundane strikes against
industrial control systems, transportation
networks, and health care providers—
because their infrastructure is out of date,
poorly maintained, ill-understood, and often
un-patchable. Worse will be the invisible
manipulation of public opinion and election
outcomes using digital tools such as targeted
advertising and deep fakes—recordings and
videos that can realistically be made via
artificial intelligence to sound like any world
leader. (Wheeler, 2018, September 12)
While “conventional” cyberwars seek
infrastructural weaknesses, information wars
benefit from social, economic, and cultural
vulnerabilities. Cyberwars and information
disorder are being manifested in many frontiers
and for numerous reasons, including monetary
gain and political power. However, to create
disinformation and information disorder, one does
not necessarily need to be a skilled hacker. An
individual’s frustrations about social and economic
conditions can turn into the fear, hatred, and
vitriol that prompt simple acts of digital violence,
such as creating, commenting on, and sharing
rumors, falsehoods, and hate speech. Hence,
information wars have many more soldiers than
do cyberwars.
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This article outlined some macro-, meso-,
and micro-level vulnerabilities that create
fertile conditions for rampant disinformation
and information disorder. It posited that the
challenge is both global and regional/national,
both economic and socio-political. There have
been some policy ideas and implementations,
institutional activities, and attempts to empower
individuals to battle information disorder. As is the
case in terms of the causes, so it is in terms of the
solutions: everything is interconnected.
However, it seems that two basic—but often
forgotten—factors determine the resilience
against fake news. The 2018 Media Literacy
Index, (Dimitrov, 2018, March 30) compiled in
European countries by the Open Society Institute,
recognizes that the media literacy and overall
level of (and accessibility to) quality education
is key, but so is the level of media freedom in a
country. These two factors correlate with one
another and bring together the macro, meso, and
micro aspects of vulnerabilities. The challenge
is, as also documented by RwB, that despite the
freedom offered by the internet, media freedom
is shrinking all around the world, and “more and
more democratically-elected leaders no longer
see the media as part of democracy’s essential
underpinning, but as an adversary to which they
openly display their aversion” [Reporters without
Borders (RwB), 2018b].
Disinformation as warfare in the digital age may
not be so different than any other type of warfare;
wars are fought for power, and some benefit
economically while the vulnerable suffer the most.
As Felice (2008) posited in his article, “Moral
Responsibility in a Time of War,” we often get
distracted by the problem of “many hands”—that
is, the causes and solutions are many and complex,
so the responsibility is not clear. This is clearly true
with information disorder. However, what makes
this case special is everyone who is active on
digital platforms can be responsible in the simplest
of ways: not lashing out, not commenting, not
sharing.
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